Yet ANOTHER court says text messages are phone calls under the TCPA

Now, if or when the are-text-messages-calls-under-the-tcpa hits the Supreme Court, all bets are off on how that political body will rule.

But in the land of facts and reason, district courts are wrestling with the problem. The latest court is Mujahid v. Newity, LLC, No. 25 C 8012, 2025 LX 517816 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2025) and it joined the diverse majority of the courts in holding that they are.

In Mujahid (all facts assumed to be true at the motion to dismiss stage and pulled from the opinion) the plaintiff received at least two text messages from Newity promoting Newity's financial offerings. As defendants are want to do, it moved to dismiss under the argument that text messages are not phone calls under the TCPA.

The TCPA imposes restrictions on telephone solicitations. Under § 227(b)(1)(A), for example, it is prohibited "to make any call" using an "automatic telephone dialing system" to "any emergency telephone line." Under § 227(b)(1)(B), for example, it is prohibited "to initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the called party." And under § 227(c)(5), the TCPA provides a private right of action for a person to seek damages if she has "received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection." The TCPA authorizes the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to "prescribe regulations to implement methods and procedures for protecting the privacy rights" set forth in the TCPA. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(2). Relevant to § 227(c)(5), the FCC promulgated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2) which states that "[n]o person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation to . . . [a] residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the Federal Government." There is no dispute that Plaintiff is a residential telephone subscriber registered with the do-not-call registry, and that she received at least two text messages. Newity argues that the private right of action under § 227(c)(5) does not apply to text messages because § 227(c) mentions "telephone call[s]" but "does not mention text messages or SMS messages, and nowhere does the TCPA define 'telephone call' to include text and/or SMS messages." R. 23 at 10 (citations omitted). In essence, Newity argues that the phrase "telephone call" encompasses only voice calls. See id. The Court finds that the phrase "telephone call," as used in § 227(c), encompasses "text messages" for the following reasons. First, interpreting § 227(c) to include text messages is supported by the statute's plain language. The "starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself." Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56 (1987) (citations omitted). And "unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). Although Newity is correct that § 227(c) does not use the term "text message," this is hardly surprising given that the statute was enacted in 1991, before the first-ever text message was sent in 1992. See Keating v. Peterson's Nelnet, LLC, 615 F. App'x 365, 370 (6th Cir. 2015) ("[T]he first text message was not sent until December 3, 1992, almost a full year after the December 20, 1991, enactment of the TCPA."). As such, the Court examines the plain meaning of the phrase "telephone call." Webster's Dictionary defines a "call" in this context as "'to communicate with or try to get into communication with a person by a telephone.'" Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary 318 (2002)). The Court finds that a text message falls within this definition. Second, interpreting § 227(c) to include text messages is consistent with the text of § 227 as a whole. See River Road Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642, 649 (7th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) ("When interpreting statutory language, the meaning attributed to a phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute, and consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the analysis."). The Supreme Court has held that when a "text message [is sent] to a cellular telephone, it is undisputed [that it] qualifies as a 'call' within the compass of § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)." Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 156 (2016). And the Seventh Circuit has held more broadly, though still in the context of § 227(b), that "[t]ext messages to a cellular telephone qualify as a 'call' within the meaning of the statute." Warciak v. Subway Restaurants, Inc., 949 F.3d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 2020). The fact that the term "call" as used in § 227(b) encompasses "text messages," supports the interpretation that the term "call" as used in § 227(c) also encompasses "text messages." See Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124, 149 (2024) ("In a given statute, the same term usually has the same meaning."). Third, interpreting § 227(c) to include text messages is confirmed by the purpose and context of the TCPA. "The TCPA was enacted to 'protect the privacy interests of residential telephone subscribers by placing restrictions on unsolicited, automated telephone calls to the home and to facilitate interstate commerce by restricting certain uses of facsimile machines and automatic dialers.'" Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 954 (citing S. Rep. No. 102-178, at 1 (1991)). The core of § 227(c) is its prohibition of "telephone solicitations." See 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1). And the statute defines "telephone solicitations" as "the initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services." 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4). "This language makes clear that Congress was more concerned with the purpose of the telephone communications it proscribed in the TCPA than the form in which those communications are transmitted." Wilson v. MEDVIDI Inc., 2025 WL 2856295, (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025); see also Abboud v. Circle K Stores Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1102 (D. Ariz. 2024) ("The purpose of a text or call determines whether it qualifies as a telephone solicitation."). Given Congress's expressly stated goal "to protect residential telephone subscribers' privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object," 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1), "it strains belief to suggest that Congress silently determined that [] oral messages were more invasive or objectionable than written ones." Wilson, 2025 WL 2856295. Fourth, interpreting § 227(c) to include text messages is consistent with guidance from the FCC. See McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs., Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146, 155 (2025) ("District courts are not bound by the agency's interpretation, but instead must determine the meaning of the law under ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, affording appropriate respect to the agency's interpretation."). The FCC has stated that § 227(b) "'encompass[es] both voice calls and text calls.'" Sagar v. Kelly Auto. Group, Inc., 2021 WL 5567408, (D. Mass. Nov. 29, 2021) (citing In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 18 F.C.C.R. 14014, 14115 (2003)). Likewise, the FCC has stated that § 227(c) includes text messages. See In the Matter of Emanuel "Manny" Hernandez, 2018 WL 6830220 (F.C.C. Dec. 21, 2018) (finding that Hernandez violated § 227(c) because it is "illegal for persons or entities, including advertisers and marketers, to make marketing calls to telephone numbers listed on the [do-not-call registry and this] prohibition includes both voice calls and text messages."). Fifth, interpreting § 227(c) to include text messages is consistent with numerous decisions by other district courts on this issue. See, e.g., Pariseau v. Built USA, LLC, 619 F. Supp. 3d 1203 (M.D. Fla. 2022); Wilson, 2025 WL 2856295; Sagar, 2021 WL 5567408. It is true that certain district courts have addressed this issue and found otherwise. See, e.g., Jones v. Blackstone Med. Servs., LLC, 2025 WL 2042764 (C.D. Ill. July 21, 2025). But other district courts have taken for granted that § 227(c) encompasses text messages without an in-depth analysis. See, e.g., Evers v. CampaignSidekick, LLC, 2025 WL 2896818, (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2025) ("[Defendant] concedes that a text message is also a "call" for [the § 227(c)(5)] claim."); Connor v. Servicequick Inc., 2025 WL 2855393, (D. Colo. Oct. 8, 2025) (citations omitted) (reading § 227(c)(5) as providing a private right of action for a "person who has received more than one telephone call [or text message]."). Ultimately, the Court's interpretation is consistent with the weight of authority. In sum, nothing in the text, structure, or purpose of the TCPA suggests a distinction between an unsolicited voice call and an unsolicited written text message. The Court concludes that a "telephone call" as used in § 227(c) encompasses the types of text messages received by Plaintiff. As stated above, § 227(c)(5) of the TCPA provides a private right of action for a person to seek damages if she has "received more than one telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this subsection." 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) (emphasis added). As alleged and as shown by a screenshot in the amended complaint, the text messages identified Newity by name and promoted Newity's financial offering by containing a link to a webpage managed by Newity. R. 20 ¶ 15. As stated above, the Court must accept well-pleaded facts as true and draw reasonable inferences in a plaintiff's favor when deciding a motion to dismiss. Here, the Court makes a reasonable inference either that Newity sent the text messages or that another entity did so on Newity's behalf.

Mujahid v. Newity_ LLC_2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221088.Pdf

Download PDF • 232KB

This joins other opinions (one we wrote about here) and the ninth circuit seems safer than others, see footnote 1 of Barton v. Delfgauw, No. 3:21-cv-05610-DGE, 2025 LX 373885 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 18, 2025):

In response to Plaintiff's motion, Defendants argue that there is no liability for text messages at all under § 227(c)(5), only phone calls, relying on Jones v. Blackstone Med. Servs., LLC, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138371, 2025 WL2042764 (C.D. Ill. July 21, 2025). (Dkt. No. 504 at 3.) This argument is foreclosed by Ninth Circuit precedent. "Reviewing this issue, we hold that a text message is a 'call' within the meaning of the TCPA." Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009). Though Satterfield's analysis employed Chevron deference, which is no longer operative, see Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 377, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 219 L. Ed. 2d 832 (2024), Satterfield remains law of the circuit and is not clearly "irreconcilable" with higher authority. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003). See Wilson v. Skopos Fin., LLC, No. 6:25-CV-00376-MC, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138638, 2025 WL 2029274, (D. Or. July 21, 2025) (continuing to apply Satterfield and holding that text messages are actionable under § 227(c)(5)).

Barton v. Delfgauw_2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159809.Pdf

Download PDF • 327KB

*** Update

California court Esquivel v. Mona Lee, Inc., No. 3:25-cv-00607-H-BLM, 2025 LX 522004 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2025) just held that the TCPA does cover text messages:

Defendant argues under statutory construction that a text message does not constitute a telephone solicitation or call under the TCPA. (Doc. No. 20.) In opposition, Plaintiff cites case law including Ninth Circuit authority and FCC guidance that a text message constitutes a telephone solicitation and call under the TCPA. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent conclude that text messages qualify as calls under the TCPA. The Supreme Court explicitly held in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez that "[a] text message to a cellular telephone, it is undisputed, qualifies as a 'call' within the compass of § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)." 577 U.S. 153, 156 (2016). Ninth Circuit precedent echoes the same, such as in Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc. where the panel held that "a text message is a 'call' within the meaning of the TCPA." 569 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit elaborated on this in Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Group, LLC, where it explained that "telemarketing text messages [], absent consent, present the precise harm and infringe the same privacy interests Congress sought to protect in enacting the TCPA." 847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2017) ("Unsolicited telemarketing phone calls or text messages, by their nature, invade the privacy and disturb the solitude of their recipients."). More recently, the Ninth Circuit has held that unwanted text messages qualify as an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing for a TCPA claim. See Hall v. Smosh Dot Com, Inc., 72 F.4th 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2023); Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043; Chennette v. Porch.com, Inc., 50 F.4th 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 2022). Plaintiff has alleged in its FAC that Defendant's text messages were in contravention of both Plaintiff's do-not-call registration and repeated requests to stop. Additionally, FCC guidance states that text messages constitute calls under the TCPA. Within both Section 227(b) and Section 227(c), Congress codified a grant of authority to the FCC to prescribe regulations guiding the enforcement of the TCPA. 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(2); 227(c)(1)-(4). A 2024 FCC regulation explicitly confirmed that Section 227(c) applies to text messages, stating "[t]he Commission adopts the proposal to codify the National DNC Registry's existing protections to text messages. Texters must have the consumer's express invitation or permission before sending a marketing text to a wireless number in the DNC Registry." Targeting and Eliminating Unlawful Text Messages, Implementation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, 89 Fed. Reg. 5098, 5101 (Jan. 26, 2024). The adoption came shortly after, effective March 26, 2024, amending Section 64.1200(e) to state that "paragraph (c) and (d) of this section are applicable to any person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls or text messages to wireless telephone numbers . . ." 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e); Targeting and Eliminating Unlawful Text Messages, 89 Fed. Reg. at 5099.

Esquivel v. Mona Lee_ Inc._2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230841.Pdf

Download PDF • 233KB

89 FR 5098_89 FR 5098.Pdf

Download PDF • 226KB

In re Rules _ Regulations Implementing the TCP Act of 1991 et al. _30 FCC Rcd 7961.Pdf

Download PDF • 1.42MB

*** Update

Yet another court (Piet v. Office Depot, LLC, No. 24-81488-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2025 LX 512936 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2025)) ruled that the TCPA applies to text messages.

Piet v. Off. Depot_ LLC_2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230981.Pdf

Download PDF • 250KB

*** Update

Wilson v. Better Mortg. Corp., 2025 LX 572466 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2025) joins the march of cases saying text messages are phone calls.

Wilson v. Better Mortg. Corp._2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 251694.Pdf

Download PDF • 582KB

Better Mortgage argues that the AC fails to state a claim because it alleges only that Wilson received unsolicited text messages—to which, it contends, § 227(c)'s private right of action for unsolicited "telephone call[s]" does not apply. The Court holds, in accord with a growing consensus of case law, that § 227(c) of the TCPA applies to text messages for multiple reasons, developed below. In brief, although modern parlance tends to distinguish between phone calls and text messages, the meaning of "telephone call" in 1991—when the TCPA was enacted—was broad enough to encompass text messages. The overwhelming weight of authority holds that § 227(b), a neighboring section using the same term, covers text messages, and the meaning of "telephone call" in § 227(c) is at least as broad as that in § 227(b). The FCC has also interpreted both § 227(b) and (c) to apply to text messages. The "starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself." Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 56, 108 S. Ct. 376, 98 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1987) (citation omitted). Courts interpret statutory language in accord with the "ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment." Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644, 654, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 207 L. Ed. 2d 218 (2020); see also Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 400, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 219 L. Ed. 2d 832 (2024) ("[E]very statute's meaning is fixed at the time of enactment." (citation omitted)); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S. Ct. 311, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1979) ("[U]nless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."). The ordinary public meaning of "telephone call" when the TCPA was enacted in 1991 was a communication made by telephone. See, e.g., Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 197 (1989) ("the act of calling on the telephone," i.e., "to get or try to get into communication by telephone," or "to deliver (a message) by telephone"); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 318 (1993) ("to communicate with or try to get into communication with a person by telephone"); see also Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2009) (same). The contemporary definition of "telephone call" was therefore not limited to oral or vocal communications. It encompassed any communication made using a telephone. Text messages fit easily within that broad definition. It is undisputed that text messages are communications sent by telephone. They therefore fall within the ordinary public meaning of "telephone call" as that term was used when the TCPA was enacted. See, e.g., Mujahid v. Newity, LLC, No. 25 Civ. 8012, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221088, 2025 WL 3140725, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2025) (so holding); Wilson v. MEDVIDI Inc., No. 25 Civ. 3996, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198827, 2025 WL 2856295, (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2025); Pariseau v. Built USA, LLC, 619 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1206-07 (M.D. Fla. 2022) (same). The context of § 227(c) also strongly supports that the provision applies to text messages. Statutes must be read as a whole, not as a collection of isolated provisions. See Territory of Guam v. United States, 593 U.S. 310, 316, 141 S. Ct. 1608, 209 L. Ed. 2d 691 (2021); King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 192 L. Ed. 2d 483 (2015). Courts therefore interpret statutory terms "in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme." King, 576 U.S. at 486 (quoting Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133, 120 S. Ct. 1291, 146 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2000)). Section 227(b) of the TCPA uses the same term as § 227(c): "telephone call." And numerous federal courts of appeals have held that § 227(b) applies to text messages, or assumed so without deciding the issue. None has construed either provision not to cover text messages. See, e.g., Breda v. Cellco P'ship, 934 F.3d 1, 4 n.1 (1st Cir. 2019) ("The TCPA also applies to . . . text messages."); Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., 894 F.3d 116, 117 n.3 (3d Cir. 2018) ("Although the text of the statute refers only to 'calls,' we have held that, under the TCPA, that term encompasses text messages." (citing Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 269 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013))); Cranor v. 5 Star Nutrition, L.L.C., 998 F.3d 686, 688 (5th Cir. 2021) ("Robocalls and robotexts are nuisances. Congress banned them in the [TCPA]."); Warciak v. Subway Rests., Inc., 949 F.3d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 2020) ("Text messages to a cellular telephone qualify as a 'call' within the meaning of the statute."); see also Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 954 (deferring to FCC's reasonable interpretation of the TCPA "to hold that a text message is a 'call'"); Drazen v. Pinto, 74 F.4th 1336, 1346 (11th Cir. 2023) (holding, under § 227(b), that receipt of one unwanted text message caused concrete injury sufficient for Article III standing).

*** Update

District court case Dilanyan v. Hugo Boss Fashions, Inc., No. 2:25-cv-05093-JLS-BFM, 2025 LX 551748 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2025) also agreed that text messages are phone calls under the TCPA and cited someone I know's case to support it.

Dilanyan v. Hugo Boss Fashions_ Inc._2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 254358.Pdf

Download PDF • 301KB

Got a Case Like This?

If you’ve encountered similar issues with telemarketers, debt collectors, or bankruptcy-related harassment, we might feature your story in a future blog post. Email your situation or legal filing to peter@nwdebtresolution.com or nathen@nwdebtresolution.com.

Are telemarketers bothering you in Washington or Oregon? I handle TCPA lawsuits in Washington State and Oregon and may be able to help.

📞 Call: 206-800-6000 / 971-800-6000

📧 Email: peter@nwdebtresolution.com

Note: The opinions in this blog are mine (Peter Schneider) and do not constitute legal advice. If you're considering suing over illegal robocalls or Do Not Call list violations, contact me for a legal consultation.

Return to blog articles

Our blog articles organized into popular topics