Washington State appeals court rules CEMA's prohibitions on unwanted text messages are broad
- Peter Schneider
- Sep 17
- 5 min read
Washington State's Consumer Electronic Mail Act prohibits unwanted text messages promoting commercial activity. But what exactly is commercial activity? Well the court in Aaland v. CRST Home Sols., LLC, 2025 Wash. App. LEXIS 1809, 2025 LX 331108 just said it's pretty broad. Let's take a look.
As usual, first some background. The plaintiff Mr. Aaland received an unwanted text message from the defendant CRST Home Solutions LLC trying to recruit him as an independent contractor. He wasn't alone, CRST had texted many Washington State residents making the same pitch.
CRST is the company behind many retailers home installation services, such as when you buy an appliance from Home Depot or Lowes. The people who come to your house don't work for Home Depot or Lowes, they work for someone like CRST and CRST hires a network of independent contractors to do the work. Keep that in mind when you buy an appliance from a big box retailer, the person in your house might be two levels removed for Home Depot or Lowes.
Mr. Aaland sued under Washington State's CEMA. A worker for CRST testified that
as a field recruiter for CRST, she “contact[ed] potential independent contractors … to potentially come on and complete delivery and installation work that CRST has with retail clients.” She explained that CRST has “contracts with retail companies to provide independent contractors who can do the delivery and installations for them. So to fulfill our contracts with the retailers, we need to have independent contractors who are interested in doing network, which means we need to find them.” Kelly testified that she cold calls, emails, or texts potential independent contractors . . . CRST representative Noah Kroll-Haeick testified that CRST’s revenue depends on its ability to maintain contractual relationships with independent contractors to perform delivery and installation services that CRST sells to retail and manufacturing company customers. When asked, “What are some … ways that CRST seeks to be more profitable than its competition?” Kroll-Haeick answered: By offering a superior product. And by that I mean successful management of the quality of the work our contractors perform. And what that boils down to is recruitment of the best contractors in the business as well as building strong, long-lasting relationships with those contractors.
CRST identified potential independent contractors to cold call by searching the internet for things like "Appliance installers in Seattle". CRST recruiters would cold contact potential independent contractors including using unsolicited calls.
Mr. Aaland's case came down to one question - was CRST's text messages aimed at recruitment promoting real property, goods, or services for sale or lease triggering the "commercial" under CEMA. The trial court found for CRST and Mr. Aaland appealed.
The sole issue on review is whether the trial court erred by deciding as a matter of law that the text messages sent by CRST do not meet the definition of “commercial” to be prohibited by CEMA. Because we hold that these text messages fall within the meaning of “commercial” under the plain language of RCW 19.190.010(3), we reverse the court’s granting of summary judgment to CRST and remand for entry of summary judgment in favor of Aaland and the class and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The appeals court noted that this was the first test of the scope of CEMA.
Aaland asks this court to adopt a broad application of subsection (3) that does not require a text message to be an unsolicited attempt to sell property, goods, or services directly to the message recipient. Aaland argues that subsection (3) encompasses, in part, the promotion of services that are for sale to anyone. In applying subsection (3) to this record, he avers that the subject text messages promoted CRST’s services sold to retail and manufacturer clients.
CEMA doesn't require an attempt to sell goods or services specifically to the message recipient but CRST's argument was they weren't promoting commercial transactions at all, they were recruiting.
CEMA doesn't define "promote" so the appeals court reached for the dictionary
a: to contribute to the growth or prosperity of: FURTHER … b: to help bring (something, such as an enterprise) into being: LAUNCH[, or] c: to present (merchandise) for buyer acceptance through advertising, publicity, or discounting. Though these definitions cover a broad range of applications, there is nothing in the statute to suggest that the legislature intended to further limit the meaning of “promote.” To do so would require this court to read additional words into the statute, which courts must not do.
With that it was all over for CRST. The appeals court found that text messages don't have to facilitate a sale of real property, goods, or service to be prohibited under CEMA. To limit the definition of a commercial text message in this way disregards the broad meaning of “promote,” which this court must assume the legislature used with particularity and intention.
The plain language of subsection (3) only otherwise limits a text message sender’s promotion of real property, goods, or services by specifying that such property, goods, or services must be “for sale or lease.” Thus, under RCW 19.190.010(3), a text message promotes a business’ services where it aims to contribute to the growth or prosperity of said business.
CRST sent the text messages for the purpose of recruiting contractors to contribute to its continued commercial success and growth and the appeals court held CRST’s text communication falls within the scope of a “commercial electronic text message” as defined by the plain and unambiguous language of RCW 19.190.010(3).
CRST tried to argue that federal courts' interpretation of CEMA should control the outcome but were rejected.
Again, the federal decisions that CRST proffers to establish that CEMA and TCPA or WADAD are substantially similar statutes do not engage in a comparative analysis of the two statutes’ relevant plain language.15 Such superficial treatment cannot supplant a Washington court’s plain language interpretation of Washington law
Federal courts liked to gloss over the differences between CEMA, WADAD, and the TCPA and in many cases, from a high level that works. But in some cases the material facts require an examination of the differences between the laws. [W]hen Washington law is different from its federal counterpart, we give effect to Washington law.
This well reasoned opinion is likely to be appealed to the Washington State Supreme Court, but it will be hard to overturn. Hats off to Mr. Aaland for sticking up for Washington State consumers!
Got a Case Like This?
If you’ve had similar problems with telemarketers, debt collectors, or bankruptcy-related harassment, we might feature your story in a future blog post. Email your situation or legal filing to peter@nwdebtresolution.com or nathen@nwdebtresolution.com.
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Note: The opinions in this blog are mine (Peter Schneider) and do not count as legal advice. If you're thinking of suing over illegal robocalls or Do Not Call list violations, contact me for a legal consultation.
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