Telemarketer Deryck Richardson of Richardson Marketing Group held personally responsible for telemarketing violations
- Peter Schneider
- 5 hours ago
- 6 min read
Telemarketer Deryck D. Richardson went on a podcast and told the world that if his company, Richardson Marketing Group, was held accountable for telemarketing violations, he would just shut down the company and start a new one doing the same thing.
So it was fitting that TCPA plaintiff Nathen Barton held him personally responsible for the telemarketing violations of his company Richardson Marketing Group in Barton v. Real Innovation. Inc. Case No. 3:24-cv-05194 (Doc. 92) (W.D. Wash. Nov. 24, 2025). As usual the background.
Plaintiff initiated this action in Clark County Superior Court, and it was removed to this Court. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants Real Innovation, Inc. (“RI”) and its founder Peter Reierson, as well as Richardson Marketing Group, LLC and its owner [Deryck D] Richardson, alleging that Defendants violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, and its implementing regulations, along with state law. (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 6, 39–44.) RI responded to the lawsuit with an answer and crossclaims against RMG. [Deryck D] Richardson accepted service on behalf of RMG. Because RMG did not file an answer to the complaint, Plaintiff moved to hold RMG in default. Richardson, appearing pro se, then filed an answer purportedly on behalf of himself and RMG, denying the claims and crossclaims. This Court held that Richardson could not answer on behalf of RMG, because Local Rule 83.2(b)(4) states that “[a] business entity, except a sole proprietorship, must be represented by counsel.” The Court deferred ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for default, affording RMG an opportunity to retain counsel and answer the complaint by September 17, 2024. That deadline came and went without any action by RMG. The Court then granted Plaintiff’s motion and ordered the Clerk to enter default against RMG, and the Clerk did so on September 19, 2024. The Court subsequently granted Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against RMG.
Not showing up to court is a common legal strategy. The thinking seems to go that the plaintiff may be unable to get a meaningful default judgment against the telemarketer, and even if he or she does, often the telemarketer can jump back into the case and ask for the default judgment to be vacated. Many courts hate TCPA plaintiffs that they'll do it, but as this case demonstrates, there are measures a plaintiff can take to make it more difficult for the court to get away with it.
One major element in holding the telemarketer himself accountable is demonstrating jurisdiction over the individual. This silly telemarketer made that job a little easier
Richardson filed a responsive pleading and did not raise personal jurisdiction as a defense, thereby waiving his right to raise personal jurisdiction later. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h); Parker v. United States, 110 F.3d 678, 682 (9th Cir. 1997). Thus, the Court has personal jurisdiction over Richardson.
You might need to build your case such that even if your telemarketer fights jurisdiction you will win the battle. I talked about how to handle the telemarketer that rolls over and plays dead during the litigation, only to jump up after an unfavorable default judgment full of spit and vinegar, and want to litigate the case, and that technique is to propound requests for admission on the recalcitrant telemarketer.
Plaintiff also argues that the Requests for Admissions (“RFA”) that Richardson did not respond to are deemed admitted and further prove Richardson’s personal liability. “It is undisputed that failure to answer or object to a proper request for admission is itself an admission: the Rule itself so states.” Asea, Inc v. S. Pac. Trans. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added) . . . [RFAs should nearly always be used on telemarketers who play dead during litigation] Here, some of the RFAs seek to have Richardson admit that he knew Plaintiff “had never consented to calls at any telephone number from any of the entities RMG was soliciting for and [he] instructed RMG to telephone solicit” Plaintiff’s phone numbers anyway. Others sought admission that Richardson knew Plaintiff had asked RMG to stop soliciting him at his phone numbers between 2019 and 2023. Finally, two RFAs requested admission that Richardson knew Plaintiff had “never consented to telephone calls from RMG that contained artificial and prerecorded voice, and [Richardson] instructed RMG to initiate calls” using an automatic dialing device anyway.” . . . RFA No. 38 asks Richardson to admit “that during the times relevant to this lawsuit you instructed RMG not to comply with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(4).” Though this RFA appears to ask Richardson to apply law to fact, an RFA is not objectionable on that basis alone. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1) (Rule 36 authorizes a party to serve “a written request to admit . . . the truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) relating to . . . (A) facts, the application of law to fact, or opinions about either.”); see also Watterson v. Garfield Beach, CVS LLC, No. 14-cv-0721-HSG (DMR), 2015 WL 2156857, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2015) (finding that RFA asking plaintiff to admit or deny whether the WellRewards programs are “wellness programs” as that term is defined under 26 C.F.R. § 54.9802–1(f)(1) was proper as an application of law to facts). The Court concludes, unlike those mentioned in Byard, these RFAs are neither vague, nor argumentative, and appear to ask for information within Richardson’s knowledge. [Be very mindful of what you ask in your RFA and how you ask it. Judges are typically anti TCPA plaintiff and will use any weakness in your RFAs to ignore them.] Thus, the RFA Nos. 13–19, 22–27, and 38–39 are deemed admitted. Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Richardson personally authorized the conduct found to have violated the statute. Therefore, the Court will find that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled 54 violations of § 227(b), for the artificial or pre-recorded voice calls. [boom shakalaka let's see this telemarketer come back on a motion to vacate the default judgment and claim he has a prima facie defense to the lawsuit]
RFAs could also be used to also establish jurisdiction over the defendant.
The Court finds that Plaintiff can recover separately for violations of both § 227(b) and § 227(c) in the same call. The text and structure of the statute and available authority all point to that result. The text states that Plaintiff is entitled to $500 for “each such violation,” and relying on that, at least one appellate court has held that “because the plain language of the TCPA ‘allows a person to recover $500 in damages for each . . . violation of this subsection,’ a plaintiff can recover separate penalties under separate sections of the TCPA even if the violations occurred in the same telephone call.” Mey v. Phillips, 71 F.4th 203, 225 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Lary v. Trinity Physician Fin. & Ins. Servs., 780 F.3d 1101, 1106 (11th Cir. 2015)). Further, the fact that each of § 227(b) and § 227(c) have their own damages provisions strongly indicate that they should be calculated separately.
I often talk about how anti-TCPA plaintiffs courts are and this opinion demonstrates it.
“If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C); see also 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). “[T]he court has wide discretion in determining the amount of damages to be awarded within statutory limits.” See Andrews v. All Green Carpet & Floor Cleaning Serv., 2015 WL 3649585, (C.D Cal. June 11, 2015) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The Court determines that damages of $500 per call—amounting to $27,000—is sufficient to both compensate Plaintiff for the calls he received from Richardson and to discourage Richardson from engaging in such behavior in the future. Additionally, without any development of the record in this case, the Court does not know whether there are any facts that would support trebling the damages.
This might be true except look at the RFAs:
What would it take beyond these admitted facts to demonstrate willfulness?
Still, Mr. Barton held Mr. Richardson personally accountable to the tune of $130,900 which isn't too shabby and will prevent Mr. Richardson from simply shutting down one company and starting up a new one to duck responsibility.
Got a Case Like This?
If you’ve encountered similar issues with telemarketers, debt collectors, or bankruptcy-related harassment, we might feature your story in a future blog post. Email your situation or legal filing to peter@nwdebtresolution.com or nathen@nwdebtresolution.com.
Are telemarketers or debt collectors bothering you in Washington or Oregon? I handle debt and TCPA lawsuits in Washington State and Oregon and may be able to help.
📞 Call: 206-800-6000 / 971-800-6000
📧 Email: peter@nwdebtresolution.com
Note: The opinions in this blog are mine (Peter Schneider) and do not constitute legal advice. If you're considering suing over illegal robocalls or Do Not Call list violations, contact me for a legal consultation.
Comments