Public service announcement - Do not confuse these businesses!
- Peter Schneider
- Jun 4
- 9 min read
Updated: Jul 23
Hey everyone, I want to do the community a solid and let everyone know not to confuse the business using the logo on the right with our friend Eric Troutman who uses the logo on the left.
*** Scroll down to the June 18, 2025 update to see that Troutman is currently on the ropes. If Symple Lending keeps pushing back, I predict Mr. Troutman quietly drops the whole thing at some point. The achilleas heel of these blow hard lawyers is they can't let people beneath them beat them.
Apparently the folks using the logo on the right are purveyors of personal loans [High Risk Lending Products in Mr. Troutman's words] with website symplelending.com and according to the near impossible to read gray fine print on a white background:
Symple Lending, LLC is a Utah licensed lender under the Utah Department of Financial Institutions. Personal loan offers provided to customers who originated via a paid Google or Bing advertisement feature rate quotes on Symple Lending of no greater than 35.99% APR with terms from 61 days to 180 months.
But according to Turizo v. Symple Lending LLC and Betts v. Symple Lending LLC, Symple Lending, LLC is also looking for customers via telemarketing. I feel for Mr. Troutman. He works very hard defending telemarketers from the bully tactics of TCPA plaintiffs, only to have a telemarketer (allegedly, according to the lawsuit filed in Troutman et al v. Symple Lending LLC) use a confusingly similar logo that might confuse consumers into thinking he is connected with an enterprise selling high-risk loan products to consumers using [God forbid!] outbound calls:
¶44 Defendant sells what appear to be high-risk loan products to consumers. Its website suggests its loan rates may have interest as high as 35%. See Symple Lending, Terms of Use, https://symplelending.com/terms-of-use (May 30, 2025). And its social media page promotes employees making over a hundred thousand dollars in commissions in a single month, with a large check bearing the Infringing Mark.
¶45 It is unclear how Defendant’s employees are able to reap such huge commissions selling loan products to consumers, unless the loans are risky in nature, reflecting their high cost and interest rates. This suggests the Defendant’s practices may be predatory in nature—and also suggests the use of the Mark is a deliberate effort to comfort consumers and falsely trick consumers into believing the products sold by Defendant are safe and backed by Troutman Amin, LLP
It turns out we all suspect illegal telemarketing is responsible for the huge commissions selling loan products to consumers:
¶62 Despite the FTC order banning Mr. Fraley from engaging in any form of telemarketing, he has somehow helped found Symple Lending—a business that apparently relies on outbound telephone calls and even has a consent to receive telemarketing calls disclosure on its website. ¶63 This is certainly not the sort of person Troutman or Troutman Amin, LLP want associated with or using its Mark.
We at NW Debt Resolution are certainly pained to hear that Mr. Troutman might be confused with a business that relies on outbound telephone calls, but over time perhaps Mr. Troutman can make a little room in his heart for Symple Lending. Mr. Troutman has tirelessly championed many other telemarketers as small businesses providing services Americans need and overly burdened with ticky tack lawsuits. We would hate to see Mr. Troutman stray from his roots and his elevated status change him. It was painful to read ¶46: Troutman Amin, LLP is known as a powerful litigation firm and not one local businesses are inclined to cross.
Troutman Amin filed for a temporary restraining order, which Symple Lending opposed and the opposition was a little spicy!
The fact that Plaintiffs have resorted to this smear campaign raises the question of whether they are so motivated to publicly attack Defendant because Defendant’s competitors are Plaintiffs’ clients. More specifically, Plaintiff Troutman Amin LLP is a defense firm that defends companies in connection with TCPA violations. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ clients are competitors of Defendant (this will be verified with competent evidence in opposition to a properly noticed motion) and a reasonable inference can be drawn that Plaintiffs are therefore incentivized to beat down their clients’ competitor, Defendant Symple Lending
Mr. Troutman won the TRO There is a reasonable likelihood that Plaintiffs will prevail on the merits . . . Plaintiffs would likely suffer irreparable injury as a result of Defendant’s use of a confusingly similar trademark to Plaintiffs’ registered trademark.
And Symple Lending will be given an opportunity to be meaningfully heard:
it is hereby ORDERED that the above-named Defendant show cause before this Court, at 411 w. 4th St., Santa Ana, California, Court Room 10C, on June 17, 2025 at 9:00 a.m. or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, why an order should not be issued pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) enjoining the following acts in any form during the pendency of this action
All kidding aside, this is an interesting case to learn some trademark law. In Symple Lending's opposition to the temporary restraining order, they said:
the plaintiff must show, at a minimum, “that the defendant ‘offers competing services to the public.’” Wash. State Republican Party v. Wash. State Grange (9th Cir. 2012) 676 F.3d 784, 795, quoting Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer (9th Cir. 2005) 403 F.3d 672, 679.
The full portion of the opinion says:
The Libertarian Party also contends that the state’s implementation of I-872 infringes its rights under federal trademark law. We review de novo the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of these claims. See Cook, 637 F.3d at 1004. [11] To establish a federal trademark infringement claim, the Libertarian Party is required to show that the defendant — here, the State of Washington — uses the Party’s registered mark “in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services.” 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (emphasis added). This “does not require any actual sale of goods [or] services.” Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). At minimum, however, the plaintiff must show that the defendant “offers competing services to the public.” Id. [12] The Libertarian Party correctly points out that “services” can include activities performed by a political party. See United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1997). But it has not plausibly alleged that the state uses party labels on the ballot to perform a service in competition with the Libertarian Party. Nor has it even attempted to make this showing. On the contrary, although the district court focused on this weakness in the Party’s case, and although the state presses the same issue in its brief on appeal, the Party has not explained how the state uses the Party’s mark in connection with the provision of competing services. We therefore affirm dismissal of the trademark claims.
*** Update
I have to say, Symple Lending came back swinging a little harder than I expected. Their response was basically to dig up a bunch of similar lion head logos. But I expect the Troutman reply to point out none of them sit on the similar background.
*** Update
I don't know if this trademark lawsuit involves attorney fees, but these two are really going at it. Troutman Amin came back with a 24 page Reply.
*** Update June 18, 2025
Wow! Ok so I checked in on this case to see how the motion for a preliminary injunction turned out. When challenging another's use of a mark, one of the elements is a showing that the defendant's use of the mark is likely to cause consumer confusion.
The likelihood of confusion is governed by the Sleekcraft 1 factors: "(1) strength of the protected mark; (2) proximity and relatedness of the goods; (3) type of goods and the degree of consumer care; (4) similarity of the protected mark and the allegedly infringing mark, (5) marketing channel convergence; (6) evidence of actual consumer confusion; (7) defendant's intent in selecting the allegedly infringing mark; and (8) likelihood of product expansion."
Strength of Protected Mark
Mr. Troutman won the first factor. The Court agrees that the mark is plainly arbitrary or fanciful, bearing little if any connection to the service it represents. While the mark weakly resembles that of some other lion-related marks across various fields,2 the conceptual strength remains strong given its arbitrary nature. Thus, the mark falls in "the two strongest categories" and "trigger[s] the highest degree of trademark protection."
Proximity and Relatedness of Goods
That is more or less where the winning stopped. [T]he overlap between the relevant purchasing class is narrow given the different fields within which each party works. At bottom, the Court finds it unlikely that a reasonable consumer would view a law firm as providing a similar service to a loan marketing and sales business, even if under the same mark.
Similarity of Marks
Mr. Troutman did little better on similarity of marks.
Symple Lending contends that Troutman's logo always appears "in lockup" or together with one of its slogans: "Troutman Amin LLP," "deserve to win," "TPCAworld.com" or "CIPAworld.com." When viewed in isolation, the two marks were "indeed identical." While the Court finds that Symple Lending's lion symbol is plainly similar in appearance to the mark, the presence of the slogans or company name in combination with the mark tends to slightly undercut the similarity of the marks when viewed in the marketplace. Indeed, on almost all of the images in Troutman's complaint, the mark is accompanied by clear and unambiguous text either identifying the law firm or referencing the firm's slogan "Deserve to Win." Similarly, from the images provided to the Court, Symple Lending likewise uses its logo in combination with the lion symbol. Thus, when viewed in the marketplace, the similarity of the marks is much weaker than when viewed in isolation
Marketing Channels
Mr. Troutman didn't win on marketing channel overlap.
The Court finds that the marketing channels do not significantly overlap. The parties offer services to different clients in different fields. The mere fact that each party uses the allegedly infringing mark on social media does not automatically create coextensive marketing channels.
Defendant's intent
Doh! Mr. Troutman eats this one.
Although "an intent to confuse customers is not required for a finding of infringement," an "intent to deceive is strong evidence of a likelihood of confusion." An inference of intent can be drawn from the fact that an accused infringer chose a similar mark from a seemingly infinite number of possible marks. Thus, this factor favors the plaintiff "where the alleged infringer adopted his mark with knowledge, actual or constructive, that it was another's trademark." . . . The Court finds that Troutman's "evidence" of intent is speculative and attenuated from a single LinkedIn connection—a ubiquitous form of social media connecting in the professional world. Such connection does not provide proof that Symple Lending knew about the logo, much less acted with intent to usurp it.
Evidence of Actual Confusion
Troutman does not provide any actual evidence of confusion. The Court agrees with Troutman, however, that given the recency of the mark's creation and use, such a lack of evidence is neither surprising nor dispositive. Thus, this factor remains neutral.
Likelihood of Expansion to Other Markets
Troutman concedes that it is not expanding into financial marketing services. Likewise, Symple Lending admits that it cannot enter into legal services. Accordingly, this factor weighs against finding a likelihood of confusion.
Degree of Care Likely to be Exercised by Consumers
A reasonably prudent consumer looking to obtain a loan or financial advice from a company such as Symple Lending would almost certainly know that Symple Lending is not a law firm. Not only would customers be expected to exercise greater care in selecting a loan servicer or a law firm, but both companies would likely exercise care in explaining the terms of their service to customers. This factor leans against finding a likelihood of confusion.
Motion outcome
On balance, the Court finds that the factors weigh against finding a likelihood of confusion. Of the eight Sleekcraft factors, only one factor—strength of the mark—strongly weighs in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion. The similarity of the marks slightly weighs in favor of finding confusion, but not enough to overcome the remaining factors, two of which remain neutral and four of which weigh against a finding of likelihood of confusion.
So, motion for a preliminary judgment denied, and we learned something about trademark law. Symple Lending went on to file an Answer, but I didn't see anything particularly interesting in it. No counterclaim, which would have been richly deserved.
The thoughts, opinions and musings of this blog are those of Peter Schneider, a consumer advocate attorney at Northwest Debt Resolution, LLC. They are just that, his thoughts, opinions and musings and should be treated as such. They are not legal advice. Do you have more questions? We would be happy to answer your questions:
Bankruptcy and debt questions:
Peter Schneider
206-800-6000 x101
Robocalls and Telephone Consumer Protection Act questions:
Nathen Barton
206-800-6000 x102
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) questions:
Peter Schneider
206-800-6000 x101
Comments