Kelly Pinn beats motion to dismiss her TCPA lawsuit + important lesson on agency
- Peter Schneider
- Aug 4
- 6 min read
Updated: Aug 6
Long time telephone consumer protection act defender Kelly Pinn survived the latest motion to dismiss thrown at her in Pinn v. Quintessa, LLC, No. 3:24-CV-3090-B, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148031 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2025).
First, the background. According to the ruling, Kelly Pinn a/k/a Kelly Bland received phone calls from caller identifying themselves as "Accidental Claim Helpline" asking if she had recently been in a car accident. Although Ms. Blank told the callers she wasn't interested and to stop calling, they persisted. The callers [ultimately identified as Quintessa] admitted InfoWorx actually initiated the calls, and the Quintessa folks [basically a lead gen for injury lawyers] eventually transferred Ms. Bland to a lawfirm.
Ms. Bland sued them all, and they all filed to dismiss the claims.
Quintessa
The quick and dirty: Bland has not adequately alleged that Quintessa is directly liable for the phone calls, but Bland has alleged that Quintessa is vicariously liable for the phone calls she received in July.
I didn't pull the complaint, but I suspect that Ms. Bland didn't directly allege that Quintessa hired InfoWorx to dial Ms. Bland as a direct employer would. Realistically, they probably didn't.
As discussed above, a defendant only directly violates § 64.1200(c)(2) if it initiates a phone call attempting to solicit business to a phone number that is on the Do-Not-Call Registry. Cunningham, 2019 WL 4282039. Here, Bland has failed to allege that Quintessa is directly liable for the phone calls she received. Bland alleges that she received phone calls from unnamed telemarketers in June and July. She then alleges that Quintessa conceded that InfoWorx placed the July phone calls. She does not allege that Quintessa placed either the June or July phone calls. While she alleges that Quintessa and InfoWorx collectively participated in a scheme to conceal Quintessa's aggressive telemarketing campaigns, this allegation does not allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that any Quintessa employee took the steps necessary to initiate the July 8 phone calls. See Dish Network, 28 F.C.C.R. at 6583. Thus, Bland has failed to allege that Quintessa is directly liable for the phone calls Bland received to her do-not-call number. Bland argues that her allegations allow the Court to infer that "the telemarketers who called Bland were working for both Defendants." The Court is not convinced. The allegations in the Amended Complaint only suggest that InfoWorx called Bland and eventually transferred Bland to Quintessa, but no allegation suggests that the telemarketers worked for Quintessa. Therefore, Bland has not alleged that Quintessa directly violated § 64.1200(c)(2).
Ms. Bland alleged the important part - Quintessa is vicariously liable for InfoWorx's phone calls.
In TCPA cases, courts within the Fifth Circuit have held that a plaintiff states a vicarious liability claim when the plaintiff alleges facts that trace the defendant to the caller. For example, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a defendant was vicariously liable for a third party's phone calls when the caller says they are calling on behalf of the defendant and the caller then transfers the plaintiff to the defendant. See Politi, 2019 WL 2519568. Other courts have found that a plaintiff plausibly alleged an agency relationship when the caller asked the plaintiff if he was interested in a service and then transferred the plaintiff to the defendant for additional discussions regarding that service. Ortega, 2025 WL 440278, (denying a motion to dismiss because the original caller asked the plaintiff "questions about business loans" before transferring the plaintiff to the defendant's owner who "spoke with [the plaintiff] about a line of credit"). Here, Bland has sufficiently alleged that Quintessa and InfoWorx have an agency relationship. InfoWorx called Bland on July 8 and asked if she was interested in a specific service: legal representation for a personal injury claim. When Bland said she had recently been in a car accident, InfoWorx transferred Bland to Quintessa's intake representative, Oshea. After InfoWorx transferred Bland to Quintessa, Quintessa helped Bland obtain legal representation for a personal injury claim, the same service that InfoWorx had spoken about to Bland. Further, the two companies gave Bland very similar names—Accidental Plan Helpline and the Accident Helpline—when she asked whom she was speaking with. The Court can draw the reasonable inference from these allegations that Quintessa and InfoWorx had an agency relationship. See Ortega, 2025 WL 440278. [The Court makes a seemingly obvious point that is important to drive home in complaints - the similar names and similar products pitched makes it more likely there is an agency relationship between them. Allege it.].
Quintessa made an argument that didn't win, but is very common and TCPA plaintiffs need to build their case to fend off. Ms. Bland shows the value of alleging the obvious - InfoWorx was selling the same services as Quintessa which supports the claim that Quintessa was InfoWorx's agent.
Quintessa cites district court cases outside of the Fifth Circuit that reasoned, at the 12(b)(6) stage, that "allegations that a plaintiff was transferred from a pre-recorded call or an initial telemarketer to a representative of the defendant are insufficient to support a claim for vicarious liability." One court found that "allegations that the initial call was transferred to Defendant's in-house telemarketer, are insufficient to establish that Defendant had the right to control the initiation of the telephone call to Plaintiff." Childress v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 17-CV-1051 MV/KBM, 2018 WL 4684209 (D.N.M. Sept. 28, 2018). However, Bland has not only alleged that InfoWorx transferred her to Quintessa. Instead, she has alleged facts that link InfoWorx and Quintessa, such as both companies offered to help Bland obtain legal representation for a personal injury claim, which the Court finds sufficient to plausibly allege an agency relationship.
Things Ms. Bland can fix in an amended complaint
Ms. Bland brought claims under §§ 64.1200(d)(2) and (3) for Quintessa's failure to train its employees on the company's do-not-call list and that Quintessa failed to add Bland to its internal do-not-call list. Ms. Bland can likely add allegations that InfoWorx was the entity that initiated the June calls and then survive on this claim.
Bland has not established that the June phone calls were made by Quintessa or InfoWorx. Bland alleges that she received several phone calls in June 2024 as part of "Defendants' June 2024 Telemarketing Campaign." She then claims that she "told these callers that she was not interested, and to stop calling." However, Bland does not allege any facts that allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Quintessa or InfoWorx placed these calls. While Quintessa admitted that InfoWorx called Bland on July 8, Quintessa did not also say that InfoWorx placed the June calls. And the June phone calls came from different phone numbers than the July calls. Further, the June callers were from "Accidental Claim Helpline," while the July callers were from "Accidental Plan Helpline" and "the Accident Helpline." . . . There are no allegations that tie any Defendant in this case to the June phone calls
InfoWorx and Perlstein [apparently a InfoWorx corporate officer]
InfoWorx claimed that Ms. Bland sued the wrong entity, that they had dissolved on April 25, 2023 [this lawsuit involved calls from a year later]. Ms. Bland alleged that InfoWorx was still winding up its affairs when the calls were placed and under Florida law,5 LLCs can be sued while they are winding up their affairs, § 605.0709(2)(b), Fla. Stat.
the Amended Complaint only includes four allegations discussing Perlstein. First, Perlstein filed a notice of dissolution with the Florida Secretary of State "that ostensibly dissolved InfoWorx on April 25, 2023." Doc. 18, Am. Compl., Second, "Perlstein is a resident and citizen of Florida.". Third, "Perlstein was InfoWorx's registered agent and manager." Id. Fourth, "Perlstein has continued to operate InfoWorx's business . . . as a sole proprietor, manager, and the person appointed to wind InfoWorx up." Id. None of these allegations suggest that Perlstein is personally liable for any alleged TCPA violations. Bland does not allege that Perlstein authorized any of the telemarketing activities or that he directly called Bland. Nor does Bland allege that Perlstein wrote the script, directed the phone calls, or otherwise took a central role in any alleged TCPA violations. See Cacho, 2024 WL 4594177. Thus, Bland has failed to plausibly allege that Perlstein is personally liable for InfoWorx's alleged TCPA violations.
Ms. Bland tried making some other arguments to pin the lawsuit on Mr. Perlstein but none of them worked. Read all about it here.
Personally suing corporate officers for the phone calls of their corporations usually requires some specific facts of their involvement in the calls AND a showing that the knew or should have known they could get hailed into your jurisdiction.
Are telemarketers bothering you in Washington or Oregon? I handle TCPA lawsuits in both states and may be able to help. If you're considering action against illegal robocalls or Do Not Call list violations, reach out for a legal consultation.
📞 Call: 206-800-6000 / 971-800-6000
📧 Email: peter@nwdebtresolution.com
Note: The opinions in this blog belong to me (Peter Schneider) and do not count as legal advice. If you’re considering suing over illegal robocalls or Do Not Call violations, please contact me for a legal consultation.
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