Heads up - your TCPA lawsuit could be transferred out of town
- Peter Schneider
- Sep 20
- 6 min read
Updated: Oct 11
I saw this recent filing and thought I'd share something that can happen in TCPA lawsuits. The case is Abramson v. Line 5, LLC, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184573.
Long time friend of the show Stewart Abramson sued Headstart Warranty Group LLC, a purveyor of vehicle service contracts. Defendant MLB Global sells them for Headstart, and Line 5 LLC handles the details of customer management and payment processing.
Despite never being a customer, he received at least 18 telemarketing phone calls from MLB Global and/or Line 5 in an artificial or prerecorded voice stating the caller was "calling on behalf of the Vehicle Services Department." Mr. Abramson played along to identify the callers.
After identifying the players, Mr. Abramson sued them all in the Western District of Pennsylvania federal court, presumably his home court. Perhaps Mr. Abramson didn't know it, but four months prior a Joseph Friel filed a similar lawsuit against Headstart and a different defendant, JEA Management out of the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Mr. Abrams court looked at transferring the lawsuit under the first filed rule:
a comity-based doctrine stating that, when duplicative lawsuits are filed successively in two different federal courts, the court where the action was filed first has priority. In some cases, "first-filed" courts have relied on the rule to enjoin litigation in other jurisdictions. In other cases, "second-filed" courts have cited the rule to defer consideration of a matter until proceedings have concluded elsewhere. Application of the rule is discretionary. If a second-filed court decides to invoke the rule, it also has the discretion to decide whether to stay, transfer, or dismiss the case before it . . . Courts will "usually" apply the rule as the "norm, not the exception." . . . As stated by the Court of Appeals, "the later-filed case must be truly duplicative of the suit before the court. That is, the one must be materially on all fours with the other. The issues must have such an identity that a determination in one action leaves little or nothing to be determined in the other." . . . District courts are divided on the question of the necessary degree of similarity of the parties, with some requiring identity of the parties and others stating that parties only need to be "substantially similar" . . . When multiple cases involve collective or class actions, the identity of the class representatives is not the issue. "In determining whether two putative class actions are substantially similar, the relevant inquiry is whether plaintiffs in the later action would be considered members of the class in the first action." . . . ("for purposes of identity of the parties when applying the first-to-file rule, courts have looked at whether there is substantial overlap with the putative class even though the class has not yet been certified.") . . . As courts have held, "the most important consideration in a first-filed rule analysis is overlapping subject matter." . . . Defendants contend that the first-filed rule applies because of the substantial similarity of this case and the Friel action. They have created a chart that compares the factual allegations of the Complaint to the nearly identical allegations in the Friel Complaint. (ECF No. 25 at 7-11.) Indeed, it is unsurprising that this case resembles Friel, as both actions were commenced by the same counsel, a factor that can be taken into consideration . . . "Once it is determined that the first-filed rule applies, and no exceptions counsel against its application, the court must determine an appropriate remedy. First, the case may be dismissed without prejudice or stayed for the duration of the first-filed matter." "Alternately, the second-filed case can be transferred to the forum where the first-filed case was brought, consistent with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)." The Court of Appeals held that "in the vast majority of cases, a court exercising its discretion under the first-filed rule should stay or transfer a second-filed suit. Even a dismissal without prejudice may create unanticipated problems. A dismissal with prejudice will almost always be an abuse of discretion." . . . For these reasons, the Court concludes that the appropriate remedy is to transfer this action to Middle District of Pennsylvania for all further proceedings.
This usually only applies to class actions, but it is very possible that your class action could be transferred out of district or out of state to join a different class action.
It is also possible that your case is transferred for other reasons. Take Hoffman v. BCI Acrylic, LLC, No. 25 CV 6107, 2025 LX 430472 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 2025). Mr. Hoffman, a Washington State resident, got phone calls to his Washington State area code number, from a Washington State area code number.
Taken from the opinion transferring the case from Illinois back to Washington State:
Bath Planet is an Illinois-headquartered manufacturer of bathroom systems, such as showers and bathtubs . . . BP Seattle, meanwhile, is a Washington-based seller of Bath Planet's products . . . Though the complaint alleges that BP Seattle is a franchisee of Bath Planet, Defendants' Dealership Agreement instead frames their relationship as "that of a [regional] buyer and a seller of Bath Planet Products" and specifically notes that BP Seattle "shall not be considered the agent or representative of" Bath Planet.
Showing jurisdiction is always a plaintiff's burden, so Mr. Hoffman had to show why an Illinois court had jurisdiction over Washington State business BP Seattle. Mr. Hoffman tried a few arguments that didn't work.
Mr. Hoffman alleged that BP Seattle and Bath Planet had a contract with Bath Planet, and there was a choice of forum clause where BP Seattle agreed to Illinois jurisdiction. Alas, even if true it didn't work. [Hoffman] alleges that such jurisdiction exists because BP Seattle "is a franchisee of an Illinois-corporation, which such franchise agreement, upon information and belief, contains Illinois choices of law and forum." This forum selection clause, he argues, evidences both the company's "consent" to be sued in Illinois and "purposeful availment."
a non-signatory to an agreement may enforce forum selection clauses only if it possesses "an 'affiliation' or mutuality' with a contracting party." . . . "Affiliation means that the non-signatory shares a corporate relationship with a signatory," such as parents and their subsidiaries, while mutuality is the "principle that if a signatory can enforce the forum selection clause against a non-signatory, then the non-signatory should be allowed to do the same." Neither is true here; Hoffman is neither affiliated with BP Seattle nor in contract with it.
Mr. Hoffman argued that through its relationship with Bath Planet, BP Seattle purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Illinois. But as long time readers of this blog know, to obtain specific jurisdiction over an out of state defendant, typically the alleged conduct that created the tort must be aimed at the forum state.
Three requirements determine "whether conduct was 'purposefully directed' at the forum state: '(1) intentional conduct (or 'intentional and allegedly tortious' conduct); (2) expressly aimed at the forum state; (3) with the defendant's knowledge that the effects would be felt—that is, the plaintiff would be injured—in the forum state.'" Hoffman focuses on BP Seattle's purchase of products from an Illinois corporation, which it then marketed (in Washington) causing his injury. But it's the directed-at-Washington marketing, not any directed-at-Illinois purchases, that would give rise to an injury.
Finally, Mr. Hoffman argued that because an agent can pull its principle into a forum state by the actions of the agent, the reverse is true. That a principle can pull the agent into a forum state
Hoffman cites agency caselaw in his opposition brief but incorrectly flips the directional arrow. Stating that, because a company may be liable under the TCPA—and thus subject to personal jurisdiction—based on the actions of its agent, it follows "a fortiori" that "when a manufacturer is subject to general personal jurisdiction as an Illinois corporation, and where the dealership agreement expressly contemplates Illinois law, the dealership is likewise subject to specific personal jurisdiction when conducting marketing for the manufacturer's products as part of that agency relationship." Johansen v. HomeAdvisor, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 3d 577, 584 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (collecting cases).] This misunderstands how liability flows between principals and agents.
Got a Case Like This?
If you’ve had similar problems with telemarketers, debt collectors, or bankruptcy-related harassment, we might feature your story in a future blog post. Email your situation or legal filing to peter@nwdebtresolution.com or nathen@nwdebtresolution.com.
Are telemarketers bothering you in Washington, Oregon, or Montana?
I handle TCPA lawsuits in Washington State and Oregon, and may be able to help.
📞 Call: 206-800-6000 / 971-800-6000
📧 Email: peter@nwdebtresolution.com
Note: The opinions in this blog are mine (Peter Schneider) and do not count as legal advice. If you're thinking of suing over illegal robocalls or Do Not Call list violations, contact me for a legal consultation.
Comments