Federal Judge knocks out telemarketer Joe Delfgauw
- Peter Schneider
- Aug 18
- 18 min read
Have you ever met someone who just can't tell the same story twice? If so, you might have met Joe Delfgauw. It seems that what ever story he thinks will solve his problem of the moment comes out his mouth, regardless of how it squares with what he said before.
That lack of ethics came to bite him as a federal judge had previously dismissed his counterclaim against Nathen Barton, and today granted Nathen Barton's motion for partial summary judgment on Mr. Barton's telemarketing claims against Mr. Delfgauw's telemarketing company. Barton v. Delfgauw, No. 3:21-cv-05610-DGE, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159809 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 18, 2025) Don't just take my word for it, see the briefing for yourself, then the court's opinion.
Filed by attorney Dawn Van Dusen, here are highlights from Mr. Delfgauw's motion for summary judgment. As you read, look for the tells in Ms. Van Dusen's work - few specific citations to the record (and when there is, what you are looking for usually isn't there), general citations to the record (she will point to a document and leave it to the reader to find the support she is looking for), no binding authority, and little persuasive authority. Spoiler alert, these arguments and 'facts' were losers:
Based on Barton’s Affirmative allegations, it is clear that Barton has used the Court system both Federal and State level maliciously and deliberately in issuing Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) civil complaints that are not justified and meritless [what telemarketer doesn't firmly believe this] . . . This is a classic “manufactured” lawsuit brought against Defendants by a serial litigator who concurrently filed virtually identical cookie-cutter lawsuits in this District Court and whose own express allegations destroy any possibility of maintaining a cognizable claim [yadda yadda yadda] . . . Barton affirmatively alleges in his Complaint consent and creation of an Established Business Relationship. Barton concedes having been able to identify Defendants on the websites he alleges visiting when he clicked on the link in the first text message. [Despite this litigation going on for four years, attorney Dawn Van Dusen argued that merely clicking on the link of an unwanted text message was consent for the telemarketer to initiate more calls. Why a telemarketing attorney would invest ink in such a dumb argument is beyond me. To be fair, Ms. Van Dusen took over for attorney Donna Gibson who appears to be on her way to the Washington State Bar Association] Barton admits that he uses the telephone and number at issue for “investigative means” . . . Once Barton visited the website, he answered questions (including submitting an address, zip code and name, therefore receiving a text message and phone call from the site.) . . . Barton continued to do this after filing the original complaint to increase his statutory damages into this manufactured lawsuit . . . Barton states that he received unconsented calls and text messages between April 1, 2021, through August 4, 2021 (for which now claims he is entitled to damages). Instead of texting “stop” [another dumb argument from attorney Dawn Van Dusen - recipients of unwanted telemarketing are under no obligation to respond to the unwanted calls with anything] Barton clicked on the link in the text message, which he alleges took him to a website that identified Defendants. Had Barton stopped there, he would not have “more than one telephone call.” [this is the holy grail that telemarketers have been after for decades, to put the burden on consumers to make the telemarketer follow the law. It has never worked] See 47 U.S.C. § 227 (c)(5). Those calls and text messages now form the basis of Barton’s frivolous lawsuit. Notably, Barton does not allege that he [mis]used the identity of a prior owner, does not allege asking anyone on a telephone call to stop calling, and does not allege responding to any text message with “STOP.” [So what, Ms. Van Dusen?] The elements of a TCPA claim are straightforward. TCPA prohibits calls made with an artificial or pre-recorded voice without the recipient’s consent [In this four year old telemarketing lawsuit, not once prior did Mr. Barton make an ATDS claim, nor is there an ATDS claim in Mr. Barton's complaint. But Dawn Van Dusen made half her motion for summary judgment about knocking out a claim that didn't exist in the lawsuit. When you read Mr. Barton's response, he doesn't even acknowledge her ATDS argument] . . . The TCPA prohibits making “any call” without the prior, express consent of the recipient “using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice” to “any telephone number assigned to a paging service [or] cellular telephone service.” . . . Defendants seeks summary judgment in its favor on Barton's TCPA claim on two bases: (1) Defendants do not utilize an automatic telephone dialing system or “ATDS”, as that term was defined by the Seventh Circuit in Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs., 950 F.3d 458, 464 (7th Cir. 2020); and (2) Barton provided the required consent to Defendants texts and calls and there is no evidence of revocation . . . There is no genuine dispute of material fact that Defendants called Barton. There is no evidence that Defendants’ system is an ATDS. And finally, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Barton consented to the receipt of such calls, without ever properly or reasonably revoking consent.14 Therefore, Barton’s claim under the TCPA must be dismissed.
What did the judge think of this useless ATDS argument from attorney Dawn Van Dusen? Let's cut over to the judge's ruling:
Defendants’ first argument in support of summary judgment is that Plaintiff failed to allege that Defendant used an “automated telephone dialing system [ATDS].” But this argument is misplaced, because use of an ATDS is an element of § 227(b) (which makes unwanted calls using an ATDS unlawful), but not § 227(c) (which provides authority for implementing regulations and penalties for violations). Plaintiff only alleges a violation of § 227(c), not § 227(b). Likewise, § 64.1200(c)(2) makes no reference to ATDS, whereas other portions of the regulation do so, see e.g., § 64.1200(a)(1). Thus, failure to allege use of an ATDS is not fatal to the particular claims Plaintiff has alleged.
Now back to attorney Dawn Van Dusen and Joe Delfgauw's MSJ:
Barton’s own allegations are that he affirmatively consented to receiving text messages and telephone calls from Defendants. He admits when he receives the text message from Defendants, he would click on the message so it would redirect him to the owner of the message . . . He also admits when he received telephone calls on his mobile device, from Defendants agents he would engage with them by [mis]using an identity.15 The plain language of the TCPA, FCC regulations and case law make clear, Barton’s concession vitiates any violation of the statute . . .
Plaintiff Nathen Barton came back at Dawn Van Dusen and Joe Delfgauw with hay maker after hay maker. First, don't fear the motion to strike:
1. Plaintiff moves to strike anything on the record concerning opt ins on renttoownhomefinder.com. For example, see Dkt 495 page 9 and footnotes 3, 11, & 17, and Dkt. 496-2. Defendants have admitted that the only “opt in” that they allege Plaintiff committed that caused them injury occurred on website educationschoolmatching.com. The Court already granted this Motion to Strike in Dkt. 276, 4:3-6. [this motion to strike in part won the motion for summary judgment. Mr. Delfguaw had allegedly been caught in some perjury and tried changing his story. It didn't work because of this motion to strike. I'll highlight this later in the judge's order] 2. Plaintiff moves to strike any alleged opt in on xanadutracking.com. See Dkt 495, 7:9-11: Barton has . . . has never denied pressing “see results” or “join” when presented with TCPA-complaint consent language on Xanadutracking.com. In Dkt. 276, 4:3-, the Court already granted a similar Motion to Strike concerning similar allegations concerning renttoownhomefinder.com. [same as above] 3. Plaintiff moves to strike Dkt. 496-1, the deposition transcript of Nathen Barton. The Defendants noticed Mr. Barton for the April 1, 2025, deposition on March 24, 2025. Exhibit 471 ¶1. After unsuccessfully trying to change the deposition time or date, on March 26, 2025, Mr. Barton timely moved in Dkt. 470 for a protective order under Rule 26(c)(1)(B)[1] to change the deposition date or time. FRCP 32(a)(5)(A) says: A deposition must not be used against a party who, having received less than 14 days’ notice of the deposition, promptly moved for a protective order under Rule 26(c)(1)(B) requesting that it not be taken or be taken at a different time or place—and this motion was still pending when the deposition was taken. Emphasis added. The motion in Dkt. 470 was still pending when the deposition was taken, so Dkt. 496-1 cannot be used against Mr. Barton and must be struck. [Attorney Dawn Van Dusen thought she was bullying Mr. Barton into a short notice deposition. Little did she know she was creating an unusable deposition. Learn the civil rules!] 4. Plaintiff moves to strike their references to Barton v. Leadpoint, Inc. The ninth circuit found that Judge Settle abused his power. One abuse of his power was attributing hearsay on a “TCPA University” website to Mr. Barton. As this Court knows because it presided over case Barton v. Walmart Inc., No. 23-5063 DGE-RJB, 2024 (W.D. Wash.), Diana Bartolome testified under oath that she created the website and all the content in it. See a filing from that case, Exhibit A, attached to the associated declaration, pages 15-19. 5. Plaintiff moves to strike “Instead of responding “STOP”” (Dkt. 495, 9:21), “Instead of texting “stop”” (Dkt. 495, 10:13), “does not allege responding to any text message with “STOP.”” (Dkt. 495, 10:19), and “Barton does not enter “STOP” request when he received the text message” (Dkt. 495, 17:19-20). The Court ordered in Dkt. 371: The defendants/counter plaintiffs should not be allowed to argue to the jury that Barton should have taken steps to prevent further calls. Dkt. 371, 2:16-18.
Mr. Barton was just getting started with punches. Blow after blow!
Mr. Barton cannot respond to things that do not exist – such as the Delfgauw Decl. at Ex B: Defendants’ Webform referenced in Footnotes 3 & 17, or Delfgauw Decl. at Ex C: Call Log referenced in footnote 4, 13 14, 15 & 16. No Exhibit C in a Delfgauw declaration seems to contain a call log. Similarly, there is no Delfgauw Decl. at Ex D: Dates and Information Used To Opt In referenced in footnote 5 and 12 . . . Their motion doesn’t address the elephant in the room – after nearly four years to investigate this case, all Mr. Delfgauw can say is [i]t is believed that Barton filled out a Starter Homes Investing Inc.-Rent to Own webform on all the above dates except June 12, 2022. Dkt. 398-10 Interrogatory #4 p. 6. Four years later all Mr. Delfgauw has is a belief consistent with his pocketbook and conclusory statements that Mr. Barton did anything on any website. While Mr. Delfgauw painted himself into a corner with lies, contradictions, and admissions.
Mr. Barton beat attorney Dawn Van Dusen and Joe Delfgauw so hard in his Response that they didn't file a Reply to his Response.
Mr. Barton filed a motion for summary judgment of his own, largely just renewing his prior MSJ that was struck by the judge, and then going on the attack against Mr. Delfgauw's perjury, lies, inconsistencies, and logical impossibilities. It was a bold move, but it paid off. I know your really just here for the judge's ruling, so I'll let you read Mr. Barton's motion, Joe Delfgauw's Response, and Mr. Barton's reply, although I have to reprint the conclusions:
If this sham goes to a jury, they may be entertained for a few days by a telemarketer with felony fraud conviction and a farcical story full of incongruent claims and contradictions, but there isn’t an actual case or controversy for them to decide. Mr. Delfgauw has the burden of consent, and he would have to demonstrate under 47 CFR § 64.1200(c)(2)(ii) that he has written consent to solicit Mr. Barton on behalf of each Seller. But he testified in Exhibit NB507 Interrogatory #7(k) (p. 8) Don’t have one. He can’t have one because Defendant’s system does not save the webform or give them what webform was filled out on dates above. Exhibit NB507 Interrogatory #4. If pressed to present any facts whatsoever of a consent for calls, Mr. Delfgauw has only his personal belief he got from looking at the above information that their system has and matching it with the dates and messages that Barton alleges in his complaint. At trial, what would Mr. Delfgauw claim is the opt-in website? His multiple admissions of educationschoolmatching.com? Or his McCrae-Coley testimony and nascent change of heart to renttoownhomefinder.com? Perhaps he doesn’t know because Defendant’s system does not save the webform or give them what webform was filled out on dates above. Imagine the confused looks on the juror’s faces when Mr. Delfgauw tells the jury by clicking on links in Mr. Delfgauw’s solicitations, Mr. Barton consented to more texts and calls. Then he is unable to explain how he would know any link was clicked on when Mr. Delfgauw’s system never stored what was texted to the 1019 phone number. Since they never stored what was texted to the 1019 phone number and had no idea what was clicked, isn’t Mr. Delfgauw’s repeated testimony about text message clicks in Dkt 404 ¶6 and ¶9, and Dkt. 444 ¶7, ¶11, and ¶15 all perjury? These declarations duped the court into ordering the disclosure of any reports or records showing a relationship between clicks on text message links and subsequent phone calls, only to come up empty. Won’t the jury feel similarly deceived? And when Mr. Delfgauw testified that on 9/13/2021 the 1019 number was removed from all calling lists and phone number databases such that no entity under Mr. Delfgauw’s control could initiate calls to it, and it wasn’t re-inserted into his database until 12/8/2021, what can the jury do but laugh in derision when Mr. Delfgauw admits he called it on 9/21/2021, 11/17/2021, and 11/23/2021? What can the jury make of the stipulation that the IP address of Google’s DNS server (Dkt. 378 ¶17) was used to opt in on educationschoolmatching.com (¶18) but then Xanadu Marketing testified it’s impossible. See Dkt 481-3 54:14-16: Q. Okay. Is there a way to do that from a DNS server? A. There is not. Mr. Delfgauw stipulated that that the person who controlled email address ivettealfredomartinez@gmail.com is the person who caused the injury the alleged in their counter claim. Yet the only evidence any but Ivette controlled this email address is Mr. Delfgauw saying is that it appear[s] to him that Mr. Barton controlled the email address. And what can the jury think when they see his admissions in Exhibit 499 ¶¶56-58 outlining the scheme between Mr. Delfgauw and his Affiliate Marketers to use click farms and spam bots to create these fake opt ins? The recordings certainly don’t change anything. We don’t know who the phone agents worked for except that they didn’t work for Xanadu or Starter Home, and we don’t know on whose behalf the calls were initiated. We don’t know what other conversations occurred between Mr. Barton and the still unknown phone agents before or concurrent to the recordings. The recordings don’t tell us anything about who asked for the calls. They only show the resulting investigation into the still unknown callers. It is undisputed that telemarketing callers hang up unless they believe they reached the person they are looking for. This reasonably necessitates Mr. Barton and other TCPA plaintiffs confirming what callers want to hear for the investigation of the entities behind the calls to move forward. In these recordings Mr. Barton isn’t alleged to say anything he wouldn’t have known from the callers and their voices, scripts, and questions. Ample authority supports using deception to unmask who is calling, who they are calling for, and the purpose of the call. Mr. Barton testified in Dkt. 464 that he used his investigative techniques for exactly this purpose. The jury can be entertained for a few days by a telemarketer with felony fraud conviction and a farcical story full of incongruent claims and contradictions, or it can end now.
I've never seen a conclusion like that in any other motion, and the Reply's conclusion was equally potent:
Their admitted symbiotic relationship with their Affiliate Marketers is the basis of their entire telemarketing operation. Why save the webform allegedly opted into when it is filled out by their own Affiliate Marketers? Or bother with saving the website? Why obtain the written consent required under 47 CFR § 64.1200(c)(2)(ii) when they know the phone numbers come from their own Affiliate Marketers? Or save the text messages sent based on the fake consents? This would all cost money, they know the text messages were sent based on fake consents, and the records would just be used against them in court. If any of their opt in story was true, why did they admit the opt in was from educationschoolmatching.com, then claim renttoownhomefinder.com? Then move to xanadutracking.com. Or was it xanaduemarketing.outgrow.com the whole time? Why did they testify one opt in was from 205.185.223.105, (Dkt 506, 7:15-21) only to change it to 71.238.123.34, which equals 8.8.8.8, Google’s DNS server. And what does it mean? They said there was evidence of the opt ins from text message clicks. Before changing to, well, how could we know anything about clicks because we don’t keep records of what we text. And they removed the 1019 number from their database such that no entity under Mr. Delfgauw’s control could call it. But they still called it, proving there are other ways phone numbers enter their dialer, which must be related to why several alleged opt ins are from Google’s DNS server IP address, something Xanadu Marketing testified was impossible. No matter what happens with this motion, Mr. Barton is well equipped for this farce to go to trial.
But enough about all that, you are here for the judge's ruling.
Ultimately the judge pretty much ignored everything and went back to Mr. Delfgauw's stipulations:
This Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) case, four years in the running, has taken many twists and turns. Previously, when Defendants belatedly disclosed call recordings that called into question some of the central tenets of Plaintiff’s case, the Court ordered limited additional discovery. Ultimately, the Court finds that the facts developed in that period do not change the outcome of this case. Rather, Defendants have stipulated their case away by stipulating and admitting lack of consent on Plaintiff’s part—and they have made no effort to extricate themselves from those stipulations. That compels the outcome. For that reason, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 497), and except as to one state law claim, DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 495.) The Court extensively detailed the long procedural history of this case in two prior orders (Dkt. Nos. 416, 462) but will summarize the most relevant developments here. Previously, in preparation for trial, the Parties submitted a joint stipulation of facts [Dkt 378 above], which has been the source of numerous problems. As relevant here, those stipulations included the following: ¶6: The language the Defendants’ claim Barton agreed to on educationschoolmatching.com by checking a box and clicking submit said entering in a phone number or email address on the website was only consenting to receive messages from a specific list of partners. None of the text messages Starter Home or Xanadu sent to (360) 910 1019 was from this specific list of partners. ¶7 Before Starter Home Investing Inc sent the seven text messages to (360) 910-1019 on April 1, 2021, advertising goods or services from Degree Locate, Get Hope To Own, credit-score-first.com, yourent2own.com, Lawsuit Winning, Lions Gate Loans, Honest Loans, and Classes & Careers, entities Degree Locate, Get Hope To Own, credit-score-first.com, yourent2own.com, Lawsuit Winning, Lions Gate Loans, Honest Loans, and Classes & Careers, Starter Home Investing Inc. and the invitation or consent from Barton to do so. Largely on the basis of the stipulation, the Court granted summary judgment against Defendants on their common law fraud counterclaim, holding that “[i]n light of these stipulated facts and the lack of other supporting evidence, it will be impossible for Defendants/Counterclaimants to carry their burden by ‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ on all nine elements of fraud.” Defendants’ theory of fraud was that Plaintiff was using the name Ivette Marquez/Jimenez to generate opt-ins and create TCPA claims under false pretenses, but the Court held that Defendants’ evidence was insufficient to go to trial. (Id. at 8–11.). Specifically, Defendants had produced a spreadsheet of opt-ins in Ivette Jimenez’s name, and a publicly-sourced IP address geolocation purporting to show that the opt-ins came from Camas, Washington, where Plaintiff lives [Ivette Jimenez lives in the same community and the defendants stipulated that the person who controlled her email address was the source of the alleged opt in but the court never cared about any of that, ever], but the Court held that Defendants failed to produce this evidence in admissible form, explain its significance, or tie the opt-ins to Plaintiff. Ultimately, the Court concludes that the stipulations dictate the outcome. The theory of Defendants’ case is that Plaintiff submitted opt-ins to phone calls and texts, but the sum total of their stipulations neuters their current arguments. As noted supra, the Parties stipulated [¶6]. What does that mean? Defendants claim that Plaintiff consented to calls by opting-into them, but Defendants already stipulated Plaintiff did not consent to receiving their calls. This is because Defendants claim the alleged opt-ins would have come through a web form on a specific site they controlled (educationonschoolmatching.com), but that site would not have covered calls from Defendant entities because they are not included in the specific list of partners. That means Defendants Starter Home and Xanadu never had consent to call. See Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d at 955 (holding that consent was invalid as to non-affiliate entities because “[c]onsent [must be] clearly and unmistakably stated”); see also Chennette v. Porch.com, Inc., 50 F.4th 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 2022) (“providing a phone number in itself [does not mean] that the consumer has expressly consented to contact for any purpose whatsoever.”). But what if Plaintiff opt-ed in from a different website? Here again, Defendants have put themselves in a bind, as Plaintiff argues. [Nathen Barton's motion to strike cut off Mr. Delfgauw's alleged perjury at the knees] Defendants previously responded to a request for admission, “Admit or deny that the only ‘opt ins’ you allege Barton to have committed that caused you injury occurred on the website educationonschoolmatching.com” by answering, “Admitted that at this time it has been determined that Plaintiff opted into marketing campaigns through website educationschoolmatching.com.” As a result, this Court (Creatura, J.) previously struck Defendants’ allegations that Plaintiff opted-in via the website renttoownhomefinder.com, because “Plaintiff provides an admission from defendants that plaintiff only opted in from educationschoolmatching.com. There is no evidence that defendants ever amended their answer.” (Dkt. No. 276 at 4) (internal citation omitted, emphasis in original). That is the same exact allegation Defendants advance now, that Plaintiff opted in via renttoownhomefinder.com. (Dkt. No. 495 at 9; 504 at 5.) But Judge Creatura’s ruling is law of the case. Ingle v. Cir. City, 408 F.3d 592, 594 (9th Cir. 2005) (“a court is generally precluded from reconsidering an issue previously decided by the same court, or a higher court in the identical case.”) [I often rag on the usefulness of admissions, but this is an example of how admissions can lock a TCPA defendant into their story so they can't suddenly change to a new one. Admissions should be used to lock TCPA defendants into the key elements of their story] Moreover, the Parties also stipulated that [¶7] In submitting this stipulation, Defendants conceded liability as to the seven text messages sent to Plaintiff on April 1, 2021. This is particularly noteworthy given that Defendants’ theory of events is that after receiving text messages, Plaintiff clicked on links embedded in them and through that process consented to further calls/texts. Assuming that is true, it could have established consent to subsequent messages, but not as to the first messages on April 1 themselves. [Attorney Dawn Van Dusen clowned herself by chasing the argument that what happens in later phone calls can provide retroactive consent for earlier text messages] To review: Defendants have stipulated that Plaintiff only opted-in from educationschoolmatching.com and have also stipulated that any opt-in from that website would not establish consent as to their text messages. So as to their theory that Plaintiff “opted in and consented to receive text messages and telephone contact” by visiting rentoownhomefinder.com (Dkt. No. 504 at 5), they have no triable case. [Doh!] Is it fair to hold the Parties to their stipulations of fact? That is how civil litigation works in the ordinary course. As the Court previously indicated, stipulations of fact are binding. (Dkt. No. 416 at 6) (quoting Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of the Univ. of California, Hastings Coll. of the L. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 676 (2010)). Moreover, “the facts to which a party has stipulated remain binding on that party throughout the various phases of the same case.” In re Jun Ho Yang, 698 F. App'x 374 (9th Cir. 2017). There are rare cases where courts have held otherwise. The Ninth Circuit has stated that “[a] stipulation will generally be enforced unless manifest injustice would result.” Lamanna v. Comm'r, 107 F. App'x 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 820 F.2d 1543, 1549 (9th Cir. 1987)). Other courts have held that a fact stipulation may be disregarded where “the evidence contrary to the stipulation was substantial.” Quest Med., Inc. v. Apprill, 90 F.3d 1080, 1087 (5th Cir. 1996). But Defendants to this point have not advanced any of those arguments, despite the Court having already issued two orders in reliance on the stipulations. (Dkt. Nos. 416, 462.) Even assuming that the stipulation is highly damaging to Defendants only because of their counsel’s failure to diligently review it, this Court has already indicated that “[t]he Court will not allow Defendants to simply disregard their own unambiguous stipulation by arguing they should be relieved of the consequences of their stipulation because they failed to diligently review it.” (Dkt. No. 462 at 7.) So too again here.
After four years of fighting it out and collecting evidence, the Court ignored all that and decided the case on Joe Delfgauw's stipulations. Stipulations that held where admissions would not. Stipulations people, understand them, use them.]
Mr. Delfgauw and his credibility just took a trashing but the fight between Mr. Barton and Joe Delfgauw / attorney Dawn Van Dusen isn't over. There are claims going to trial and there is a state case picking up where the federal lawsuit left off, but now the outcome is how much Mr. Barton is going to collect instead of will he win or lose. So stay tuned, there are many more rounds to this fight.
Are telemarketers bothering you in Washington or Oregon? I handle TCPA lawsuits in both states and may be able to help. If you're considering action against illegal robocalls or Do Not Call list violations, reach out for a legal consultation.
📞 Call: 206-800-6000 / 971-800-6000
📧 Email: peter@nwdebtresolution.com
Note: The opinions in this blog belong to me (Peter Schneider) and do not count as legal advice. If you’re considering suing over illegal robocalls or Do Not Call violations, please contact me for a legal consultation.